Harry, what if you would begin? I mean, first up for the record where we're here on July the 13th, 2005.
We're speaking with Harry all bright and Harry, I wonder if you would just begin by telling us a little bit about your background, how tell us about how you came to be associated with CSEA and approximately when that was.
Okay, I'm an Albanian. I grew up in Albany, went to the schools in Albany. I then went in the service when I was 18 and the program called the ASTP, which was a program like the A12 and the V12, the V12 was for the Navy and I was and they gave you an examination for that, a technical examination.
And if you had, as I had poor eyesight, I was in the eligible for the Navy but the idea was you were to go to college when you went in the service and get to be and go to become an officer and an engineer of which I was totally unqualified.
At any rate, when I came out of the service, I curiously had written my thesis when I was at Yale on Albany politics and had learned a great deal about the O'Connell machine.
And John Kelly, who I was my predecessor and colleague at the Degraff firm, was a product of the Albany school system and I recall that his describing Albany at the time, which was really had no industry.
The industry really was pretty much what it is today and the size of the city was about the same as it is today.
So Albany has really not grown, as I understand it, particularly since that time. But it was an Irish Catholic Democrat.
John Kelly used to tell me that when he was a kid, his mother told him if he got lost to say my name is John Kelly, Irish Catholic Democrat and you'll get home.
So I wrote my thesis in Albany politics and I did not wish to become, although I was philosophically a liberal Democrat, a worshiper of Franklin Roosevelt.
I did not wish to become a part of that machine morally and as far as integrity went.
So I registered as Republican because I knew I was weak and what they would do is the Albany Democrats would take young lawyers and offer them assistant corporation councils, assistant DAs.
And you got three or four thousand dollars, which was a lot of money in those days. And it was hard to resist.
I registered as a Republican. I then ended up in a Hinron Strab, Pee Gors, Manning and Titan. It was called then.
And my father was president of the National Savings Bank and they were the attorneys for the bank.
And I found that to be a disagreeable relationship for me in barricading. My father was president of their largest client.
And so I would go out with Ben Strab for dinner in the evenings and then be the lowest guy in the totem pole taking orders from the secretaries and going in the center and carrying Ben's cleaning table.
Cleaning to the cleaners. So I ended up in the graph firm after about a year or two with the Hinron firm by chance.
And was assigned to two duties. One was I read Barg Sam's for Mr. DeGraf. And I was assigned to assist John Kelly at the
time who was then the real counsel. John DeGraf's senior always retained the title of counsel. But the real counsel was John Kelly at the time.
To the CSEA. To the CSEA. And he represented them. And I brought and I have given to you, John's who I think of very highly and fondly and admiringly.
I have for you his assignment in the so-called Mitchell Bill, which was a bill relating to veterans preferences. I never knew anything about that.
The time I was there was the time that the State Health Insurance Plan was being negotiated. And that was principally by John DeGraf's senior. And one of my early duties, earliest duties, was to go around the state in various chapters and explain how that plan worked, which was a very vital and still is a very vital part of the membership I would think of the association.
I just want to come back to all of this, but just to kind of flesh out your bio a little bit further and briefly. You were with the DeGraf firm for about 10 years before you joined the Rockefeller administration.
We represented the law firm being a local firm, represented the medical society that stood in New York and the home builders. I represented them. And I received that assignment essentially through Joe Philly, who was the president of the association. His wife was then an important figure in the home builders. And she referred them to me.
And we represented the CSCA, obviously. And that was perhaps the largest retainer we had and the largest and most important client.
But we represented all kinds of people in the legislature. And therefore I became known to the Rockefeller administration and ultimately had a terrible battle with the governor.
Not so much on CSCA matters, but on the medical society. And that was the implementation of Medicare and Medicaid, Title 18 and Title 19 of the old, Curramidals Bill. And it became a hot issue. And the medical society had a great dispute with the governor.
So at one time I ended up in a significant dispute with Rockefeller. And apparently he said to his counsel then who was Bob Douglas. And this guy's got so many ideas. Why don't we get him on board here. And so I ended up as deputy secretary to Al Marshall, who was the important figure and really chief of staff. And he became really the acting governor.
And when Rockefeller was away campaigning. So he was an important figure and still is highly knowledgeable. And I urge you to, if you can, if he's well enough to speak to him. And he can tell you the genesis of the Taylor Law and at the time.
Did you held other positions in the Rockefeller administration?
I ended up after a period of time as deputy secretary and appointments officer. A job I did not want. But came to discover was very important and far more important than I realized.
Do you want that light on?
Okay.
Actually while we're on a break here, let me put that light on you a little bit.
Okay.
Am I, am I too verbose?
No, it's perfect.
Right on the mark.
There.
So better.
That doesn't, that flops. That's the trouble with that.
Yeah. Just to get a little light from this thing.
Okay.
If you want to move that closer, it's okay with me.
I think we're going to be good.
Okay.
It seems to be getting a little brighter out.
Okay.
Okay.
And you were just, you were telling us some of the other positions?
Well, I ended up as appointment secretary and then I ended up as executive assistant to the governor, which was a title that had been occupied by his, by Sam Waldewich at some earlier time in George Hinman during the early part of his administration.
And that gave me a cabinet position.
And that was what at the time that Al Marshall had retired as secretary and Bob Douglas had become secretary to the governor.
And then after about a year or so of that assignment, I ended up as superintendent of banks and then special counsel to him when he became vice president.
And then I ended up in a completely different role in the latter part of next part.
And when I, just before I was 50, I ended up as president of the dime savings bank.
And when I retired at age 65 after 15 years there, I was temporarily went back into government in a pro bono kind of capacity is appointed by
Governor Cuomo as chairman of Battery Park City authority.
And then when I retired from, I was appointed by the Federal Reserve as trustee in the BCCI matter as the sole shareholder of the, of the first American corporation, which was the largest bank, which had to be separated in its ownership.
And I was appointed at that position by Judge Joyce, Federal Judge Joyce, was on the green at the behest of the Federal Reserve.
So I've had a variety of assignments, all of which have been terribly interesting.
Wonderful. Let's go back. And if you would, tell me a little bit about the deGraf law firm. Do you know their origins in representing CSEA?
I don't know it myself, but my recollection is that the association at that time was anything but a union.
It was, I think, essentially, an employee pay-all insurance group.
And it more or less negotiated with the various administrations for state salaries and represented the political subdueditions through what were called chapters at the time.
I don't know why they're so-called chapters of the political subdivisions, but the genesis of the, the real genesis of the deGraf relationship was with a Dr. Tolman, who was, I think, perhaps maybe one of the very first of the presidents of the association.
And that was the time when its genesis was essentially oriented around the reform of the civil service.
And I don't think that unions were a part of the political subdivisions or the states across the country.
They were resented unions were resented and feared because of their possible political influence and the growth of state and federal governments, state and local governments.
But the association at that time did conduct discussions and negotiations.
And my impression is that the largest and most important glue that kept the association together in its members was its House organ or its communications division, which was then called the civil service leader.
And the editor of the leader, Paul Kair, was a very significant political force who could buttress the role of counsel or the president and had a lot of political clout.
Because all he had to do was to put your picture in and there were real personalities who were very important at the delegates meeting, representing large constituencies.
And at that time, the state was probably, the association was probably, I would say, about 125,000 strong.
And during the early part of various governors roles, but principally in the time of, until Al Smith, the governor's role was a relatively small one, two-year terms.
And the state service was composed of the regulatory agencies, banking and insurance, which were important parts of the state, administration, but mostly corrections and metal hygiene.
And they were the two largest sectors, and they had the political clout at delegates meetings that they stood together to really control the policy and the positions on salaries and the like.
Well, to tell me while you were talking about the delegates meetings, were those several day affairs, they generally held in Albany?
Yes, they were big time fun affairs, with a lot of drinking and curousing and parties and dances and a lot of fun.
But the delegates meetings and they were two or three hundred strong and they were held, I think, as I recall it, in the top, huge room in the top floor of the Ten I Hotel, which there were two major hotels in Albany at the time.
The Duit Clinton and the Ten Ike and both are gone now. But they were really exciting places to be around.
And I used to tell lawyers that you could be on the top floor, go up the top of the state street and you could go from the lowest court to the highest court on one street, starting a case in,
we'll say city court, then going to the next building in the county court, which had the Supreme Court, the appeals, then going to the Pell Division in the county court house building, then going next door to the highest court, which was in the middle, the Court of Appeals.
And I used to be able to walk up State Street Hill and say hello and know everyone by name when I was a young lawyer walking up there.
It was a very small town and you knew everyone in the cop on the corner and the like.
The go back to the delegates meeting because I know that we as we've read about the early history of the organization, it seemed that there was an annual dinner that would be held.
Was the delegates meeting an outgrowth of that annual dinner, or multiple day affair?
I believe that the annual dinner was a dinner normally that was put on at the end of the delegates meeting, but the delegates meetings.
When we talked briefly on the telephone the other day, setting this meeting up, I can recall that a comment that I made that everything that the delegates voted on was determined in resolutions.
And they would call for all kinds of things, 10% increases and salary and the like.
And almost all of those had to be introduced in legislation.
So if there was a salary bill or anything of that kind or corrections, a piece of their status was a very large issue frequently and which meant the ability to carry a gun.
And that was a bill and all kinds of any kinds of reforms in civil service law were always in resolutions passed by the delegates.
And my principal assignment when I first went with John Kelly from the law firm was to be the parliamentarian and I had to learn backwards and forwards, Robert's rules of order.
Because it was a very important role as parliamentarian on how the meeting would be conducted.
Because how you ruled was very important and I learned a great deal from that.
So largely the agenda that you had to follow as an attorney representing the organization flowed directly from the will of the delegates that they were...
Exactly. And the resolutions they passed.
And frequently you would go to them with proposals.
For example, two examples that are, I think, highly significant.
One was a so-called McKinsey study on salaries.
And these would start with meetings with the division of the budget and the budget director, which was essentially only had...
And I still think has only about six or eight exempt positions for the director of the division of the budget.
And so it was a really civil service professional group.
And over the many years of democratic administrations, the salary increases that had been approved, modest as they were for employees, was caused a compression.
Because they were flat, $300 across the board, $400 across the board.
And this is a typical democratic approach that everything would be treated equally.
Well, it is a result. It compressed all the salaries at the top.
So that deputies were sometimes earning as much or even more than the commissioners.
And so when Rockefeller came in, he decided that he couldn't adequately recruit commissioners, because he couldn't pay them enough.
And so he came through his representatives to me and said, how would you like to have a significant accordion where everybody gets a significant percentage increase?
But the percentages will be the highest for commissioners. Well, this is heresy with most...
But I explained to people that if we went for this deal, that there would be a lot of room for motion upwards.
And right now, the senior staff were compressed.
Now, the significance of this is that the association consisted of politically, the cloud and control was in the numbers of people who represented by corrections and metal hygiene.
And as a result of that, they had to go along or approve of it.
And I remember going to some very tough correction officers and saying, what do you think of this?
And they almost knocked me across the room when I first explained that it would mean a commissioner would get a significantly higher percentage than across the board.
But when they saw that they, that the real costs of a salary increase are further numbers, and the commissioners would only be about 2% of the whole on the budget needs, they saw the wisdom of that.
So I consider this a huge, huge and large issue for the association correction officers and the political side of things to see the wisdom of this.
And it never could have happened in the legislature without the support of the CSCA.
And it never could have, and it took a lot of guts on the part of the governor to propose.
But it came from a study by McKinsey and Co.
What kind of, you're talking about the fact that you needed to go out and kind of sell this.
So what kind of give and take was there between you as a council to the organization and the leadership and then down to the rank and file?
How did that work?
And it worked in the following manner.
Leading up to a salary negotiations with the state.
The executive director of the association who at that time was a man by the name of Joe Lockner.
And Joe and a group of his staff and salary people and studies would be made.
And they would do comparative outside studies with private industry and submit those to the civil service department.
And the division, there was a man by name of Kelly who ran that.
Division of classification and something of that kind.
Class and comp. It was in the civil service department at the time.
And they made a study and made a recommendation as to what would be called for.
So there were preliminary discussions for the division of the budget and the staff, the internal staff, before it ever got to the delegates.
Then when the delegates convened, that's when they had this huge array of people out.
And in the audience. And you could tell really what was whether you were receiving approval or disapproval just by looking at the audience and seeing whether they were with you or against you.
And I started to say that I learned so much in this process.
For example, I remember I was being pilloried at one time for not introducing a bill.
And the bill, I remember what the bill was. We had something like 80, 90 resolutions.
And each of these had to be have an introductory number in the Senate and the assembly and the like.
And I would produce this list, which the delegates had.
And there was a bill or resolution that was introduced every year that provided that the governor would not have a veto.
And there was a bill of approval power through the division of the budget of reclassifications and reallocations by the civil service when they would take a group and approve them.
And for example, when I oiled superintendant of banks, I was astonished to discover that after we got approval of a reclassification for examiners to have it turned down by the division of the budget.
But this was dirty pool. But anyway, I had this bill and I had not introduced it.
And I remember reacting to this man. He was a small guy. Sam, I've forgotten what his name.
And I remember standing in the middle with a little microphone on the angle.
And I got angry. And I said, don't, Sam, don't you realize that the governor will veto any bill that takes away his own powers?
And then Sam, I had the group with me, as it were.
John Kelly had been missing and I had been a significant factor in controlling the debate through Robert's rules.
And I remember, Sam said, how much do we pay your law firm? This is a democracy. I mean, I paraphrasing. I don't know what the exact words were.
And he said, and you went to Yale, and then you went to law school and you come from this fancy law firm and we pay you big money.
And you're telling me that you decided that you wouldn't bother to introduce the bill as a result of the delegates actions because you knew better.
Who do you think, and I saw this, this sea of disapproval suddenly.
And the goodwill I had, which was about this thin drifting off.
And I remember that I got up and everyone, Sam was about the same size as I was. And I was really hot, was younger.
And I remember people saying to me, they thought I was going to go down the hit him. And I remember, I saw this disappearance of all the goodwill I'd had.
And he was absolutely right in criticizing me. And I walked down and reached for him. And I took his hand and said, Sam, you're absolutely right, I'm sorry.
And he supported me, no matter what I would say, from then on. And I had political support. And this is how frequently you were able to get delegates support and votes for things that you were.
I was urging implementation of the McKinsey Bill. I was urging certain things. And later on we had the so-called 5% take home pay when the state ran out of money.
And I remember, I think it came from a man by the name of Galpin, who worked on the staff of the association and was the studier of, and he pointed out that changes in the retirement law were not paid for.
Until the next year, the bill came in a year late. At that time, the employees were not contributing, or contributing, I think, towards the retirement.
And it varied vastly. But the average was certainly over 8 or 9, 10%. And the governor had explained to the association that he didn't have any money and he couldn't pass. And he'd run out of bill on the legislatures. He didn't have any money.
And so we said to him, how would you like to give us an 8 and a half percent increase? And it would cost you less than that. And you wouldn't have to pay for it this year at all.
And that's merely by reducing the contribution by 5% and with the taxes relating and the tax-free and so forth.
And he left with the idea and we sold it in 15 minutes.
Was this Rockefeller?
Rockefeller.
But at the beginning of Rockefeller's administration, it was not a happy relationship because as most new administrations came in, they wanted to replace people with their own people.
And we took the position that they were going too far. We were taking people who were an exempt in the labor class, in construction, across the board, and putting Republicans in there.
So we started racking in the CSEA, Racking, Rockefeller. And I'm sure it's true today. But the CSEA by its numbers then had enormous cloud politically.
For example, in Iceland, we could literally designate who the Assemblyman would be from Iceland because there were so many civil service employees working in the hospital.
And this huge hospital, and this is true in upstate New York and Sarenak and all kinds of places, where correction and we could tell it, we had a lot of glitter in the cloud.
And in addition to that, we had this newspaper. And newspapers in capital cities are very important. And that's why your role in terms of public relations has got to be so fascinating to you.
Because the Times Union, then there was the Nicarbacca News and the Times Union, the people who read those newspapers were the civil service, the residents of Albany, but the legislature.
And that was the only time this small capital city could influence by going to the legislature. And they were the famous author.
First there was Arbor's Chummers, and then who is the other man who has written so much Kennedy?
He was then covering the CSEA and I knew him then, covering the civil service meetings. And Arbor's Chummers and what he wrote. And the role of council, therefore, was a huge role.
And the other side of it was the political negotiations with the state. It's relationship with the leader, it's relationship with the president of the association, and how much he relied upon the council.
And all of these were intermingled with the huge political cloud that the association had.
You talked about the political cloud of being able to choose who the assemblyman might be in a particular place. How much was that wielded directly? Because a lot of what I've read in the research was that particularly with the state wide offices, the organization didn't actually take a stand on endorsing a candidate for governor or a state wide office.
No, they did not.
So, what would the candidates give the candidates a platform to present their views to the membership?
They would, at their meetings and invite them to speak. They were given them a platform, but they did not endorse. That's correct.
You want to remember that the tradition of the association at that time was a civil service reform group that didn't dirty its hands with politics.
It was a civil service and it was anti-political as it were.
But, and I don't think it exercised the association, exercised its control over assemblymen and so forth.
I remember when I spoke at a chapter meeting at any place that the local assemblyman or senator wasn't present and making nice talk to the employees particularly where they were in a segregated small containment where they took a position against someone or for someone.
They didn't make the difference between, but there was very little of what I would call open endorsement. It was quite subtle.
Well, you talk about the fact that you would take the marching orders as counsel from the delegates and then have to go and draft legislation and try to move it through legislative process.
Clearly, in the legislative process there's often a lot of give and take and sometimes you have to compromise. How did you then feedback and get instructions on how to proceed if you weren't going to get the whole loaf?
Well, it depended. If it was a civil service bill as such, I remember I had a bill that no one thought I could ever pass and it had something to do with non-competitive after you five continuous years of service.
I couldn't bounce you from that position. You had someone so-called tenure. The legislature and the administration did not choose to lose the ability to appoint exempt positions in any degree.
But occasionally the legislature would, so in response to your question, I would have very little latitude if it was a clear cut resolution, the one I cited earlier, the elimination of the veto power of the division of the budget.
No, that either had to go exactly the way, but if it was a sorry negotiation, then you would negotiate that like the McKinsey study, the five percent. And you would go back to the delegates when they met and they would either approve or not approve what was essentially a compromise. So it depended on the nature of the legislation.
One of the things that comes to mind the way you're describing this here and from what I've heard from others is that there is almost like a dichotomy of the organization that there was a certain rigidness that the delegates would be offering resolutions and saying this is what must be done or should be done.
But by the same token, there seemed to be a lot of flexibility within the organization to try to adapt to changing circumstances.
I think that was, I would go along with your premise except a lot.
It's a phrase I don't think that if it was ambiguous and different, it had to go back to the delegates and they really had the control.
And that's why the relationship between counsel and having the goodwill of correction officers, I remember that occasionally I was not in sync with the role myself of the law firm on certain issues.
I thought we should be doing something differently. But my relationship had to do with the editor of the Civil Service Leader, the President of the Association, the small key staff around the President, just the way it is I'm sure today in any organization.
Whether you're talking about the White House or you're talking about Albany and the Executive Chamber or you're talking about the CSEA.
How much of the legislation that you would introduce was specific to the state employees and how much might affect political subdivisions?
Well, it took me a long time to grasp that the political subdivisions were because they were so dispersed but also so large in numbers.
And when we had large chapters like Irving Flaminbounds name, it comes to mind, that was Nassau County.
And there was really collective bargaining as it was. And you'd go down and meet with the county exec and you'd practically have pickets going up around and you'd hit them with resolutions.
But I couldn't guess how much in the way of resolutions, most of the activity as I recall it related to the state.
But since Civil Service reforms all affected the political subdivisions and things like retirement matters, the so-called death gamble, which was a constant theme of all the delegates, whether they were contributing too much or too little to the retirement system, whether it was collecting too much, whether it was overfunded,
those issues related to everyone in the state, the political subdivisions in the state. But if it related to state salaries, that was where the trauma came, it seemed to me, and the flexibility that you referred to, but coming back to the delegates for political sponsorship and survival.
The one thing you couldn't do was you couldn't be a company union, which was the charge constantly by competitors, NAFVL and CIO, which was then asked me, which was a small competitor at the time, that the CSEA was a company union.
And it was a huge debate that continually raged and then culminated when the Taylor Law came in, and the association actually changed after my time and became a real union member and part of a larger tradition.
And the significance of that was the difference between the eliminating management and having various segments of collective bargaining and collective bargaining contracts.
There was no collective bargaining right. There were no grievance procedures. Grievance procedures were traditionally included in contracts. Grievance procedures and collective bargaining contracts included a grievance procedure. And I remember one of the grievance procedures that was set up by Rockefeller under an executive water.
I'd love to talk about that because it's a fat ending to me.
Tell me a little more about that.
Well, South Corbin was then an assistant counsel, and the administration had been in war with the Rockefeller administration, and Dr. Ronin was then the secretary of the governor.
And the war had to do with continuously criticizing the administration for politicizing and firing and appointing too many people in the highway department, which was transportation, which was a fairly significant size at the time, probably ranking not terribly far below corrections and the division of mental hygiene.
The health department was small. The regulatory agencies were small. Important is health in terms of state services and conservation and the like.
But they were not large political forces, the way corrections. But anyway, this ended up with an awareness on the part of the members that they had no rights to complain.
It was all rigid under civil service. And Corbin had been a collective bargaining lawyer on the outside with labor unions, and he didn't think of grievance procedures in any way except as part of a collective bargaining contract.
And I remember trying to convince him that we ought to have a minimal agreement that an employee could file a complaint if he was aggrieved.
And so it was a very simple and direct but hugely effective, in my opinion, least hugely effective grievance procedures.
The first thing an employee did who was aggrieved was to file a complaint against his supervisor. And the second thing, then it went to the second stage, which was the supervisor had to say yes or no, and then it was reviewed by the commissioner.
So because human nature is what it is, if you have a complaint and you have a grievance against someone, there's always a little bit of writing wrong on both sides.
And no supervisor likes to have his or her record subjected to scrutiny at the second level.
So employees would file grievances, and they'd all be settled because no one, they would, they were working out. And it was very rare that you'd ever have to go to the commission.
And so the first thing that I would do was to file a complaint against someone who was aggrieved was to file a complaint against someone who was aggrieved.
And so I would file a complaint against someone who was aggrieved and they'd all be settled because no one was aggrieved.
And so I would file a complaint against someone who was aggrieved and they'd all be settled because no one was aggrieved and they'd all be settled because no one was aggrieved and they'd all be settled because no one was aggrieved and they'd all be aggrieved and they'd all be settled because no one was aggrieved and they'd all be aggrieved and they'd all be aggrieved and they'd all be aggrieved and they'd all be aggrieved and they'd all be aggrieved and they'd all be aggrieved and they'd all be aggrieved and they'd all be aggrieved and they'd all be aggrieved and they'd all be aggrieved and they'd all be aggrieved and they'd all be aggrieved and they'd all be aggrieved and they'd all be aggrieved and they'd all be aggrieved and they'd all be aggrieved and they'd all be aggrieved and they'd all be aggrieved and they'd
Yes, in ancient policy to have them in ancient policy to have them in ancient policy to have them in ancient policy to have them in ancient policy to have
And so we have slap buckets and we have to go to the bathroom with windows and throw the
slap bucket against the side when we're through.
And I remember getting the testimony before McGinnis.
And we produced these people who would say, yes, the Chaplain's office and the family
had a community had a place right outside of their children without playing.
And we'd have to throw feces off the side of the prison.
And the argument was it would cost the state a lot of money to put water in.
And McGinnis said, I've heard enough, that's it.
We're going to get the money from the division of the budget.
And he decided in our favor.
So there were areas where lawyers could help these staff and employees and be not a company
union and a political group to support.
And there were article 78 proceedings where you could sue.
And those were, those became the special expertise of the deGraf firm.
Interesting.
Coming up on 45 minutes on the paper.
You got 15 more minutes on this tape.
You're okay to keep going for it now.
Whatever you want.
It's up to you.
Let's go.
Tell me a little bit about the insurance program that the CSEA had.
How important was that to the effectiveness of the organization and building its membership?
I don't really know the history of it.
But I know that it was hugely important that the insurance was so cheap, term insurance,
that no one really could compete against it.
And it was commissioners and everybody belonged to the CSEA for the insurgurantium, nothing
else.
This gave it huge numbers.
And I think it was a real reason why it was so important.
How did it work with their insurance agents who went out and sold membership in order
to get the insurance and the thing?
I don't really recall that well.
It was a traveler's and there was a firm in connected, a brokerage firm, Tribush and
Powell.
I don't know whether they still represent it.
They do.
Different incarnation, but same company.
Same company.
And so that was a big client of them.
The travelers, it was a huge client.
And as I told you, it had a fascinating.
I did know a little bit of the background of why the travelers were so effective.
And competitive because the employees, highly democratic, the delegates would want to have
the insurance program thrown up for negotiation and competitive bidding, which I thought was
very worthwhile, but no one could bid against the travelers.
And the reason was the origins of group insurance were in the early part of that century when
there were many groups like the Elks and so forth that developed employee pay-all insurance,
group insurance.
But it was absolutely essential that you had to have new memories coming in because if
you had everybody who was getting old, they'd all have to be paid off because everyone's
going to die.
Everyone.
You, me, everyone's going to die.
So sooner or later, and if you don't have money coming in to support the plan, so the
state at the time in the insurance department, an unciated policy that said, essentially,
that you couldn't just offer this very cheap insurance.
You had to charge it up so that if you didn't have new membership, you'd be able to pay
up.
So they had minimum rates and they established one.
As time went on, the minimum rates became the floor and no one could compete against the
minimum rates, but as they were newly established by law.
So the travelers had a right and they had, because the CSCA had continued new membership.
It was a stable.
They had a very worthwhile effective program.
I think that the insurance, when I was there, was hugely important for the CSCA's growth
and negotiating larger issues like health insurance and a number of days of sick leave and the
like.
This was made possible by virtue of the numbers.
As I described, the politics of it were subtle.
Not as endorsement prone.
So I think my impression was that the council's office was not as influential in that political
sense as it was after I left there.
That would be because they could negotiate with the governor for an endorsement and then
take it back and hope that they were operating within the context of the.
But they became, I'm sure, a huge political factor.
You referenced what we first began talking that one of the first projects you worked on
when you came to the graph firm was the state insurance program.
Health insurance program.
I wondered if you talked a little bit more about that.
Well, I really don't know that much about where the health insurance plan stands now.
But the state health plan, it was always striking to me.
Yes, that's a logical point for a break anyway.
Okay.
Good.
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