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Crisis in Colombian prisons: C ause or C onsequence of a
flawed judicial system?
Jasson Jair Hernandez V. and Isaac Dyner R.
Universidad de los Andes and Universidad Nacional de Colombia
Email: idyner@ unalmed.edu.co
Abstract
This paper examines the crisis that has been recently detected in Colombian prisons, by
investigating the interactions between the judicial system and crime. We develop a
simulation model, based on the economic theory of crime, in order to explain system
behavior and to analyze alternative policies that may contribute to resolve some of the
problems affecting Colombian prisons.
Among the most important variables included in the model are the profitability of crime, re-
socialization of criminals, and effectiveness of justice. Simulations show that the cause of
the penitential crisis is not the overcrowding problem, but the effect of flowed policies and
the structure of the judicial system. We found that in spite of its higher short-term costs,
longer sentences reduce crime. Conversely, as short sentences make crime more profitable,
simulations show that reduction of sentences will increase the congestion of the judicial
system in the long run.
1, The Colombian penitential system
The increasing number of crimes in Colombia demands both high capacity and organization
of prisons. The severe pressure that, at present time, is suffering the penitential system
might be the result of failures related to the administration of sentences, insufficient re-
socialization programs, and poor management and security. In addition, the criteria applied
during the present crisis has not contributed to solve the problem, as improvisation and the
lack of a long-term view to policy making have been dominant.
During the last four years, the convicted population has fluctuated between 38000 and
46000 inmates. By March 1999, overcrowding of prisons reached 38.4% - 45498 inmates
with capacity for 32868. As can be observed in table 1, overcrowding is persistent,
although with high volatility.
Table 1. INPEC(2000)
YEAR CAPACITY | INMATES | OVERCROWDING%
1990 28.380 32.387 14.1
1991 28.303 29.356 3.7
1992 28.252 26.962 -4.6
1993 27.560 28.550 3.6
1994 26.709 29.431 10.2
1995 27.822 31.960 14.9
1996 28.332 38.062 34.3
1997 29.313 41.404 41.2
1998 32.995 42.831 29.8
1999 32.868 45.498 38.4
AVERAGE 28.661 33.570 17.1
During this period of time, the national penitential institution (INPEC) has increased
expenditure by an average of 27.98% annually, as can be appreciated in table 2. Operation
costs, which represent approximately 82.12% of total, have had an increment of 27.67%,
being personnel expenses the most significant item with an annual increase of 32.88%. On
average, investment expenses represent 17.88% of the total, with an annual increase of
36.91%.
Table 2. Budget evolution, INPEC(2000)
Year Operation Change % | Investment | Change % | Total
1996 118.618,2 21.539,6 140.158
1997 148.843,2 25,48 29.856,3 38,6 178.700
1998 184.342,8 23,85 56.727,0 90,0 241.070
1999 246.443,3 33,69 46.589,3 (17,6) 293.033
Between 1996 and 1998, INPEC invested US$54 million for housing 2128 cells and for
improving 35 penitentiaries. In 1999 investment was US$23.2 million; 57% less than in the
previous year, in spite of the fact that the convicted population had increased. These
figures show that the distribution of resources is unbalanced, and that the effort to increase
investment has not been enough to solve the overcrowding problem.
On top of the overcrowding problem, re-socialization programs, such as employment and
training programs, have had low attention. Only 41.3% of convicts have had access to
employment programs and 24.9% to training programs. Nearly 34% of the convicted
population does not redeem sentences. In addition, most of the penitential centers are very
old: only 14% have been built over the last 20 years. Security in these centers is low; there
is one security guard for 7.3 inmates, on average, which represents a deficit of 10000
guards.
According to studies carried out by the Commission on the Rationalization of Public
Expenses (1996), the administration of justice faces many problems. High degree of
congestion, inefficiency, ineffectiveness and an impunity rate of 97%, are the result of a
variety of factors and complex relations among a large number of variables that have an
important effect on the Colombian society. The Civil Society and its Agenda for Colombia
(1998) has identified problems related to the schooling and training of the justice workers.
The absence of appropriate academic formation, ethical values and philosophical principles
gives way to corruption.
The situation of the Colombian penitential system is not very different from those in other
Latin-American countries. A Human Rights Watch report, Prison project of New York
(1998), shows the large demand for prisons in Latin America and the Caribbean. Countries
like Honduras and Venezuela exhibit overcrowding rates of 50 and 32% respectively.
Table 3 compares the convicted population per 100000 inhabitants for some chosen
countries within and outside Latin America. As can be appreciated, Colombia is one of the
countries with highest number of prisoners per 100000 inhabitants.
Table 3 Human Rights Watch, Prison Project of New Y ork (1998)
Country Prisoners as % Country Prisoners as
(Outside LA) of 100000 (Latin American) | % of 100000
inhabitants inhabitants
India 34 El Salvador 105
apan 42 Mexico 100
Ireland 44 Dominican Rep. 119
Albania 55 Colombia 121
Denmark 71 Costa Rica 138
Australia 79 J amaica 153
South Africa 311 Venezuela 153
USA 455 Chile 192
Canada 111 Bolivia 50
China 111
Maintenance cost per inmate reaches US$92 per day in the United States, whereas in
Colombia this cost is about US$10, and in other Latin American countries, such as
Venezuela, is about US$2.
The Justice Department of the United States has established that the average term served in
prison for violent crimes is three years and seven months; this term is equivalent to 48% of
the original sentence. For murder, average prison term is five years and eleven months,
near 71% of the original sentence. Statistics indicate that 46% of re-offenses would be
avoided if sentences had been completed. For the Colombian case, the average term served
in prison is two and a half years.
It has been established that with longer prison sentences, the criminality rate diminishes
(Levitt, 1996). Levitt found that, on average, imprisonment of an offender prevents the
commission of 15 crimes. If increasing prison sentences by 15% there would be a
reduction of 10% in the criminality rate of the United States. Marvell and Moody (1996)
estimated that 21 crimes would be avoided by imprisonment policies. Spelman (1994)
calculated that between 16 and 20 crimes would be prevented by keeping a criminal in jail,
while Cohen (1987) found that this number would be 12. Based on research conducted by
inmates, Dilulio (1995) established that an average of 15 crimes may be prevented by
imprisonment.
In Colombia there has not been similar research and the available data is limited. Based on
the accessible information, it could be deduced that an increment of 10% of the population
of inmates leads to an average decrease of 4.7% in the number of offenses. However,
further evidence and research is required to support this assertion and other issues related
with the application of justice, in particular with respect to the delay effects that must be
taken into account when administrating justice.
2. Theoretical background
Our research is based on the economic theory of crime and it is supported by system
dynamics as will be discussed ahead. The fundament of this paper is the work by Becker
(1968), which assumes that criminals maximize their utility functions - by estimating the
costs and benefits of carrying out an illegal activity.
The theoretical scheme provided in Becker (1968) may benefits from a system dynamics
perspective when trying to understand a particular complex systems. Specifically, we
include elements, which lie outside the theory, and that explain particular behavior with the
help of delays and feedback relations (Sterman, 2000; Forrester, 1961).
In Becker's model, the four key elements are: 1) damages and offenses, 2) cost of
apprehension and conviction, 3) the supply of offenses, and 4) punishment. In the
following sections we briefly describe these elements and provide some of the most
important relations (Becker, 1968):
Damages and offences
Becker establishes that the harm inflicted by criminals to society, H(O), is a function of the
offences, O (O - offenses), and that H’>0 (is decreasing). The net cost or damage to
society, D(O), is the difference between harm, H(O), and the society gain, G(O):
D(O) =H(0)-G(0).
It is possible that offenders receive diminishing marginal gains, G(O)"<0, and cause
increasing marginal harm, H(O)">0, and that
D" =H"-G" 50.
Since H(O)’ and G(O)’>0, society will seek to move along the interval where:
D(O)’>0
Cost of apprehension and conviction
The criminal activity (A) depends on: the probability of conviction (p), the number of
offenses (O), and the arrests (a),
A =h(p,0,a)
In Becker's model, the cost of clearing convictions is obtained as a function of the criminal
activity:
C =C(A)
Offenses
The offense is established as a function of the probability of conviction, p, the punishment,
f, and a variable u, which corresponds to other factors such as the entry into illegal activities
and the ability to commit a crime.
0 =O(p,f,u)
Punishment
According to this approach, punishment can be converted into costs, which can be either
monetary or related to employment possibilities. The cost of punishment, f, for individuals
is inferior to that assumed by society, f', and is estimated as follows:
f =bf
b>1
Where b is the coefficient that transforms f into f'. In case of fines, b is approximately 0.
Punishment cost affects not only individuals, but also society, and f' is the social cost.
According to the economy of welfare and the relations described above, one can estimate
the social loss caused by crimes as:
L =L(D,C,bf,0)
The design of policies for penitential systems seek for a balance between costs and social
benefits. From this perspective, Becker proposes that the factors affecting the costs and
benefits of the criminal actions should be incorporated in the design of justice policies.
Phillips (1973) and Rubi (1978) identify four types of policies: punishing of the offender;
disabling, so that the offender can not further commit crimes; rehabilitation; and deterrence
for both potential offenders, and those already condemned.
3. The model
When taking a systems view to the problem, which incorporates not only the causes of
crime but also some possible remedies, as well as other important issues related to the
administration of justice, a complement to Becker’s model might naturally emerge. Figure
1 shows the main relations exhibited in Becker's model. It also includes the elements that
contribute to the commission of crimes, adding policy elements that may contribute to the
reduction of the burden that has to bear the penitentiary system.
ab sentences
Offenses (0) (@) recluses
recluses/prison
Oportunity
cost of Overcrowding ) RK
crime(u) in prisons CO
| ( Prisons
Capture Building of new
Probability (p) Sentences
reduction prisons CO
Sentence duration (f)
Figure 1. Dynamics of crime in the model of Becker.
Figure 1 shows how the offenses committed by criminals increases overcrowding of
prisons, imposing pressure on the system, driving administrators to consider policies such
as:
* Reduction of sentences through relaxed regulation. In this way, inmates will achieve
freedom before completion of prison terms.
* Increase of budget in items such as investment in infrastructure and training programs
for inmates.
As Figure 1 indicates, both types of policies represent high costs. The economic theory of
crime establishes additional relations between the floating population of law offenders, who
commit crimes, and private and public expenditures needed to control criminality. These
relations are shown in Figure 2.
i
Social
Cc Offenses (0) deterioration
i Crime
Opportunity cost
of offenses (u) benefits
Capture Cri
robabili rime
ih) profitability
Prevention and
clearance cost C(A)
Re-socialization
Figure 2. Economic rationality of crime
By linking system dynamics with the economic theory of crime, we take a systems
perspective to understand the effects of the main interaction within the criminal sector (e.g.
prisons, judges, offending population and police). By incorporating feedback and delays,
system dynamics facilitates the assessment of the interactions within the system, and helps
to explain its dynamics. In the case of the judiciary system it may help understanding the
causes and effects of the penitential crisis and to analyze the impact of policies on the
system.
Figure 3 shows simulation results that allows comparisons between what could happen
under the present policy (line 1) and what could occur under alternative policies (2 and 3),
considering reductions or increases in sentences by 25% (lines 2 and 3 respectively).
1204
90)
Sentences
60}
0 5 10 15 20 25
Time
Figure 3. Simulation of the effects of penalty policies over the number of sentences.
As previous analysis indicates, the reduction of penalties that, in the short term, alleviates
the crowding of prisons would, in the long term, have counterproductive effects in the
judiciary system. Although the proposed reductions of effective penalties, ranging from 25
to 40%, would temporarily reduce the number of prisoners by 15%, this would increase
criminality in the long run.
Alternatively, a deterrence project currently discussed in the Colombian congress for
increasing prison terms to an average of 4 years seems a more positive policy, as can be
appreciated in Figure 4 (line 3). Although inmate population does not decreases drastically,
the expected behavior in the long run is an alleviation of almost 35% of prisons crowding.
This behavior is more valuable that the reduction of effective sentences or adoption of no
policy at all, as can be observed in Figure 4 (lines 2 and 1 respectively).
2,0-
15
1,0
Time
Figure 4. Simulation of jails crowding under different penalty policies
The policy of increasing penalties has effects on offenses similar to those of overcrowding.
With longer sentences, offenses drop considerably below the average of other policies.
This behavior is the result of a lower profitability of crime.
The cost of punishment varies according to the policies implemented. With deterrence
policies and more effective capture and judgment of criminals, social benefits can be
achieved, with a reduction of criminality and of prison costs, as shown in Figure 5 (line 3).
1204
904
Sentences
604
0 5 10 15 20 25
Time
Figure 5. Simulated effects of an increased efficiency in judicial system
We now tum to the evaluation of the model proposed in this paper in order to assess the
validity of the policies being investigated. This has to be acknowledged as preliminary
results of on-going research.
4. Model validation
Sterman (2000), Shereckengost (1997), and Roberts (1993), propose that validation must
focus on the usefulness of the model rather than on other issues. According to these
authors, a model is valid when it can be used with confidence and security. These authors
have propose tests of model structure and behavior, which we partly present ahead.
Tests of model structure
The first step consists on determining if the structure of the model is that of the system
being modeled. The model that has been presented was developed considering the mental
models of the staff of national penitential institution, INPEC. We also considered
conceptual models described by law and other theoretical sources.
The second step is parameter estimation. Parameters were calculated based on historical
behavior, from available information. Certain parameters of the model, in particular those
related to profitability of crimes, are difficult to calculate, due to the absence of data and
relevant studies. In these cases, international data was used, with adaptations to country-
specific conditions.
The need of research is stressed by the deficiency of judicial statistics, as Fundacion
Presencia (1997) establishes in its study of justice. In spite of these difficulties, the model
broadly reflects the behavior of the judicial system, when comparing simulated results of
historical conditions with historical information, showing a good approximation between
both results, as can be appreciated ahead, which may provide some confidence in the use of
the model.
Tests of model behavior
We evaluated the model with respect to historical information (1987-1999). The results
obtained show that the model approximates well the actual behavior of the system. As
shown in Figure 6, the levels of overcrowding in prison centers and of inmates are similar
to those described in the first sections of this paper. The average size of the offending
population and the number of offenses committed per year are very close to the estimations
of national police (1997) and the commission on rationalization of public expenditures
(1996).
& +. crimes 2: CROWDING 3: PRISIONERS
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SNP @ woven vauioiry Years 09:56 am. 11/16/1998 [—
Figure 6. Simulating history (1987-99) under model conditions. Elements for validation.
Finally, the model describes correctly the increasing costs of criminality. Since the new
1991 constitution, the judiciary system has required a larger amount of resources to cope
with increases in offenses and consequently making demands for more judges, policing and
prisons, putting pressure on the justice system as a whole. Expenditure only began to grow
in 1995 when the penitential system was alarmed for the growth observed in prisoners and
the overcrowding of prisons.
5. Policy analysis
In the absence of policies, inmates will increase three times as much during the next 20
years, to a number between 165000 and 180000 prisoners, as can be observed in Figure 7a.
This figure shows simulation results, considering the present and historical rates of
attention in the judicial system, the apprehension activities of police, and the growth in
Colombian population.
Non-convicted offenders would increase their participation. Although the rate of
recurrence would remain high, its growth would slow down slightly and this rate of
recurrence would increase 10% from its present value of 70%. Success in re-socialization
programs would then be very low, as can be observed in Figure 7a. If the opportunity cost
of legal activities for offenders does not improve, the situation would largely deteriorate,
because of the lack of legal opportunities, making crime more profitable, which contributes
to the commitment of offenses.
Figure 7b shows the reduction of criminality and overcrowding with penalties 25% higher
and more efficiency of police, expressed in the increment of the probability of capturing a
criminal from 0.5 to 0.65.
B cane FRSIONERS ORION Bi cnnes 2 PRISONERS S CROWNE
1 bteur y dear :
Poa ed A f & aeeTb
2 (pea 2 ann
gmgl ll
ah
i 3 iw :
:
capes || |
' 1
2 “Sieh L¢ 2 “ani
Sten STM
io ns eH 25 Et) i ah ny as Et)
Na Yeas ‘adam treeani Sig Yes ‘San seri
a b
Figure 7. The dynamics of crime, prison crowding and prisoners as result of hardened
policies
Figure 8 indicates that the expansion of the penitential system would demand greater
expenditures, characterized by a deficit of resources for re-socialization programs, and the
redemption of penalties. A great part of judicial resources would be assigned to the
operation of prisons and maintenance of prisoners, while little investment would be
available for infrastructure.
With respect to social costs, it was found that increases in criminality induces non-linear
increases in costs. Using Rubio’s (1994) estimates and our own ones, which maybe
undervalued, the present social costs of crime - currently around US$900 million - may
quadruple to about US$3.5 billion, which shows that crime may become more profitable.
Social benefits depend on the accomplishment of the penitential system. It means that by
disabling criminals, the current savings which reach to about US$1.5 billion may double to
about US$3 billion. Following the ideas of Hayward (1996), a policy that combines
deterrence and investment in the prison system, although not a definite solution, tums to be
a valuable policy in terms of the balance that must be achieved between social costs and
benefits.
# 1: sustice costs 2: CRIME COSTS 3: SOCIAL COST 4: SECURITY INVESTMENTS
£ Banesoro Tae teaatonies
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SSB cratioa 47 costs dat Sector Cran Years He@am,_ 142/000 [—
Figure 8. Costs and expenditures of judicial system
In our research, we also analyzed alternative policies, not discussed in this paper for space
constrains, including:
6.
Increasing investment in penitential infrastructure as well as in opportunities to redeem
penalties. This policy not only reduces effective penalty time, but also rises the
opportunity costs of the legal activities for inmates when they complete their sentences,
deterring them from offending again.
Strengthening measures to secure offenders, other than preventive detention. For minor
offences, we considered penalties such as conditional liberty, warnings, home detention
and fines. This policy would reduce preventive detention by at least 20%.
Overcrowding would be reduced on average by 25% and would reduce the growth of
new prisoners by 10-15%.
Conclusions
A number of conclusions which, in general, coincide with those that have been found by
Levitt and Rubio (2000) and Alesina (2001) are reported next:
Overcrowding is not the fundamental cause of the prisons' crisis. The crisis is the result
of policies, originated exogenously and endogenously to the judiciary system, that have
had an effect on the profitability of crime.
Imprisonment reduces crime, although not completely. It is an expensive strategy to
combat crime in the short-term. However, is a profitable policy to Colombia because its
application would allow savings in the long run.
Even with high levels of overcrowding in prisons, and with a penitential system in
crisis, not enough criminals are locked-up for a sufficiently long period of time to
reduce criminality in Colombia. Therefore, it is necessary to apply a policy that
combines disabling, investment in infrastructure, and hardening of sentences. This
combination offers the best results in terms of social welfare and crime reduction.
e It does not seem convenient to apply normative measures to free inmates before the
expiration of their sentences. A policy of this kind harms the cost of punishment,
increases the profitability of offenses, affects the rationalization process, and harms the
deterring power of the State, and consequently increases crime.
¢ In order to alleviate conditions of the sentenced population, other altematives, different
than preventive detention, may be considered. Those policies include fines, total
indemnification of victims, and reduction of social costs.
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